Association of Competition Economics ACE





ACE Annual Conference Programme November 11th and 12th 2010 at UEA in Norwich, UK

More: http://www.uea.ac.uk/ccp and http://www.competitioneconomics.org

Program overview

Thursday 11th November

12:00-13:00	Registration and Lunch
13:00–13:30	Introduction: Dr. Peter Davis, President ACE
	Welcome: Professor Catherine Waddams Director, Center for Competition Policy, UEA
13:30–15:00	Plenary Session
15:00–15:30	Coffee Break
15:30–17:00	Parallel Sessions (I-III)
19:00-21:30	Conference Dinner at Delia's Restaurant

Friday 12th November

09:00–10:30	Parallel Sessions (IV-VI)
10:30-11:00	Coffee Break
11:00–12:30	Parallel Sessions (VII-IX)
12:30-13:30	Lunch
13:30–14:00	AGM and Presentation of the 2010 ACE Prize for the "Best paper of the year"
14:00–15:30	Plenary Session. Roundtable
15:30	End of the ACE 2009 Conference

Program details

Thursday 11th November

12:00–13:00 Registration and Lunch

13:00–13:30 Introduction: Dr. Peter Davis, President ACE

Welcome: Professor Catherine Waddams, Director

Center for Competition Policy, UEA

13:30–15:00 Topic: The role of UPP in Merger Evaluation. Jurisdiction: All

Chair: Dr. Peter Davis (CC)

Speakers: Professor Joe Farrell (FTC and University of Berkeley)

Professor Ariel Pakes (Harvard University)

Dr. Amelia Fletcher (OFT) Dr. Greg Leonard (NERA)

15:00-15:30 Coffee Break

15:30-17:00 Parallell Sessions (I-III)

15:30–17:00 Panel I: Article 101: Oneworld Airline Alliance.

Chair: Dean Paul Dobson (University of East Anglia)

Speakers: Dr. Szabolcs Lorincz (DG Comp.)

Dr. Manuel Godinho de Matos (DG Comp.)

Professor Jan Brueckner (University of California, Irvine)

Dr. Benoit Durand (RBB)

15:30-17:00 Panel II:

Mergers: Convertible car-top production: Edscha/Webasto and Karmann/Magna

Decisions in a Sequence of Merger Proposals: Convertible Car Rooftops

The convertible car top industry in Europe is beauty concentrated. In 2

The convertible car top industry in Europe is heavily concentrated. In 2008, there were four major players, two of which became insolvent in the aftermath of the crisis. In December 2009, the German Cartel Office cleared the takeover of Edscha (in insolvency) by Webasto, whilst in May 2010 it stopped the takeover of Karman (also in insolvency) by Magna, the fast growing Canadian automotive component supplier. The former clearance decision was motivated by observed competitive practice, whilst the latter prohibition was motivated by expected parallel conduct between the remaining firms, on the grounds of experimental evidence. This gives rise to the conceptual question as to the use of such evidence in merger proceedings.

Chair: Professor Konrad Stahl, University of Mannheim

Speakers: Dr. Christian Ewald, (Bundeskartellamt)

Professor Theo Normann (Goethe University, Frankfurt)

Dr. Rainer Nitsche (ESMT Competition Analysis)

15:30-17:00 Panel III: Merger: Yellow Pages Netherlands/De Telefoongids

In 2008 the Netherlands Competition Authority cleared the merger between Yellow Pages Netherlands (Gouden Gids) and De Telefoongids, the only two national print directories in the Netherlands. At first sight, the merger looks like a two-to-one merger. However, after a thorough investigation and remedies offered by the parties, the merger was cleared.

The decision to clear this merger is based on economic arguments supported by substantial research efforts. First of all, the two-sided nature of the market is taken into account: advertisers value the number of readers and readers value advertisements. This relationship was tested via econometric analyses and a questionnaire amongst advertisers and readers. Second, in media markets the price per eyeball is important. It was argued that, as a result of the merger, the price per eyeball would decrease. This is only possible if the number of readers increases enough and if the crowding out effect (more advertisements make each individual advertisement less visible) is not too big. Survey evidence supported this argument,. However, this argument only works if the two directories are integrated into one. Therefore a lower price per eyeball is secured by means of the remedy that both directories are integrated into one. Finally, the impact of online advertisements and online directories are taken into account as a disciplinary factor in this market.

The case raises interesting issues, which are likely to arise in other two-sided markets cases, with respect to a) the treatment of efficiencies deriving from network effects and b) the definition of consumer welfare.

Chair: Professor Maarten Pieter Schinkel, Amsterdam

Speakers Dr. R.G.M. Kemp (NMa)

Dr. Matthijs Visser (RBB)

Professor Lapo Filistrucchi (Tilburg)

19:00-21:30 Conference Dinner at Delia's Restaurant

Friday 12th November

09:00-10:30 Parallell Sessions (IV-VI)

Panel IV: Article 102: Qualcomm and Rambus

The session will deal with issues related to the abuse of dominant positions by firms which have intellectual property rights that are included in a standard. The cases of Qualcomm and of Rambus - that have been investigated both in the US and in the EU - will be discussed, by stressing the hold-up problems in standard-setting, which lie behind the related issues of "patent ambushes" and of FRAND terms (licensing terms of patents that are included in standards are usually required to be Fair, Reasonable, And Non-Discriminatory).

Chair: Professor Massimo Motta, Barcelona

Speakers: Dr. Mario Mariniello (DG Comp)

Professor Gerard Llobet (Cemfi and LECG)

Professor Patrick Rey (Toulouse)

09:00-10:30 Panel V:

Kraft/Cadbury and the Role of Econometrics in Competition Policy

Chair: Professor Marc Ivaldi, Toulouse
Speakers: Dr. Hugh Wills (CRA)

Dr. Alejandro Requejo (LECG) Professor Howard Smith (Oxford)

09:00-10:30 Panel VI: Market Inquiry: UK Groceries Market and The Competition Test

Following a Market Investigation into the supply of groceries in the UK, the Competition Commission put forward a number of measures to remedy the adverse effects on competition it had identified. Following an appeal to the Competition Appeal Tribunal, the Competition Commission was asked to reconsider the merit of introducing a "competition test" in order to regulate the development of additional groceries floor space in concentrated areas. This session focuses on this part of the inquiry. It will discuss the general approach to assessing economic costs and benefits of introducing a measure such as the "competition test" as well as the specific methods used by the CC, and put forward by various parties to the inquiry, in this case.

Chair: Professor Lars Sørgard (NHH, Bergen)

Speakers: Dr. David Parker (Frontier)

Professor Greg Crawford (Warwick)

Dr. Nicola Mazzaroto (CC)

10:30-11:00 Coffee Break

11:00–12:30 Parallell Sessions (VII-IX)

Panel VII: Article 102: Tine/Synnøve Finden.

In 2007, the Norwegian Competition Authority decided among other things that TINE, a producer of cheese, had abused its dominant position for example by ensuring exclusivity at retail chain Rema 1000. The abuse consisted of paying retailers not to carry the cheese of rivals, notably Synnøve Finden. TINE took the case to court and won a victory in the first instance in 2009 at Oslo Tingrett. In an appeal at a higher court (Lagmannsretten), TINE was convicted of abuse of dominance. This case is now pending a Supreme Court judgement. The economic arguments that we review in the session center on whether TINE was dominant, on market delineation and the Cellophane Fallacy.

Chair: Professor Peter Møllgaard, Copenhagen Business School

Speakers: Professor Nils-Henrik Mørch von der Fehr (University of Oslo)

Professor Tommy S. Gabrielsen (University of Bergen)

Professor Morten Hviid (CCP)

11:00-12:30 Panel VIII: Article 101: Interchange fees - "Bank case".

Chair: Professor Bruno Jullien, Toulouse

Speakers :: Dr. Cédrik Nouel de Buzonniére, Autorité de la Concurrence

Marianne Verdier, University of Nanterre

Dr. Daid Sevy, LECG

11:00-12:30 Panel IX : Spanish sugar cartel

Chair: Professor Kai Uwe Kuhn, Michigan

Speakers: Dr. Fernando Jimenez (NERA)

Dr. Nadine Watson (LECG)

Professor Frank Verboven (Leuven)

12:30-13:30 Lunch

13:30-14:00 AGM and

Presentation of the 2010 ACE Prize for the "Best Published Paper in

Competition Economics"

14:00–15:30 Plenary Session Roundtable

State Aid: In Banking Roundtable (including Lloyds/HBOS divestitures)

Chair: Mark Williams, NERA

Dr. Stan Maes (DG Comp.)
Professor Bruce Lyons (UEA)
Dr. Helen Jenkins (Oxera)
Dr. Lorenzo Coppi (CRA)

15:30 End of the ACE 2009 Conference